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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I examine the valuation effects of trading in the U.S. as non-exchange 
issues i.e. Level 1 and 144 firms for non-U.S. firms. The study is motivated by two facts; 
first, while the number of new Level 2/3 issues has fallen 2001, Level 1 issues have 
remained an attractive listing option for non-U.S. firms. Second, while on theoretical 
grounds, firms from low-disclosure regimes have most to gain from exchange listing; these 
firms tend to list in the U.S. as non-exchange issues. Here, I examine whether the 
continuing attractiveness of, and the tendency of firms to choose a Level 1/144a listing is 
value enhancing. My results suggest that the tendency on the part of firms from low-
disclosure regimes to choose non-exchange issues is justified. Relative to their high-
disclosure peers, these firms tend to gain most from trading in the U.S. However, for Rule 
144a issues, the valuation gains are short-lived. 
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1.  Introduction 
During the 1990’s, United States capital markets became the most attractive location for a secondary 
listing on International markets for non-U.S. firms. For example, at its peak, the number of depositary 
receipt programs numbered almost 2,200. At the same time, the share of foreign firms listed on 
European exchanges fell (See Pagano, Roell, Zechner (2002), and International Federation of Stock 
Exchanges (www.fibv.com)). For example, the share of foreign firms listed on the NYSE and the 
Nasdaq rose from 10.97% and 7.04% in 1995 to 19.95% and 10.44% in 2002, respectively. Foreign 
lists on the London Stock Exchange fell from 531 (21.22%) to 383 (16.81%) over the same period. 
Furthermore, non-U.S. firms have demonstrated a marked preference towards trading as Level 1 over-
the-counter non-exchange issues (as opposed to Level 2/3 exchange issues) in the U.S. For example, in 
2001 the number of Level 1 issues stood at 759, compared to 563 Level 2/3 exchange issues. In 
addition, the number of new Level 1 issues has outstripped new Level 2/3 issues in every year since 
2001 (See Bank of New York (2006)). 
Grounded in what is commonly referred to as the ‘legal finance’ literature, an exchange-cross-
listing (as opposed to a Level 1/Rule 144a issue) in the U.S. provides a remedy for firms to overcome 
their financing constraints at home, and thus facilitate their hitherto stagnated growth. Financing 
constraints tend to be greatest for firms domiciled in countries where investors are poorly protected 
(See La Porta et al., 1998 and Demerguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998 for the legal finance view, and 
Coffee, 1999, 2002 and Lins et al., 2005 for arguments specific to cross-listing). Consistent with this 
line of reasoning, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004, DKS Hereafter) outline a theoretical model 
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whereby the valuation gains from exchange cross-listing, what they term a ‘cross listing premium’, is 
increasing in growth opportunities, and decreasing in domestic investor protection. This suggests that 
firms from low-disclosure regimes should demonstrate a marked preference for Level 2/3 exchange 
issues. 
However, Hope, Kang, and Zang (2007, HKZ Hereafter), document evidence to the contrary. 
Using logit analysis, they show that while firms from low-disclosure regimes are more likely cross-list; 
they are less likely to exchange cross-list (i.e. Level 2/3 issue). In this paper, I examine whether the 
decision on the part of these firms to list as Level 1/144a issues is justified, at least on the grounds of 
value 1. 
Using a panel of Level 1 and Rule 144a issues over the period from 1990 to 2003, I begin by 
estimating the cross listing premium for Level 1 and 144a firms in calendar time (1997) as DKS (2004) 
do. From here, I motivate the use of a longitudinal approach, which is then outlined. My results suggest 
that the tendency on the part of low-disclosure firms to trade in the U.S. as non-exchange issues is 
justified. Specifically, these firms tend to experience the greatest gains from trading, relative to their 
high-disclosure counterparts. However, unlike Level 1 issues, the valuation gains for 144a firms tend 
not to be long lasting. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section I outline the data. Then I present 
estimates of the cross listing premium in calendar and event time. Section 4 concludes 
 
 
2.  Data 
I begin by sourcing a full list of firms with a cross listing in the U.S. All information on cross-listed 
firms is sourced from the Bank of New York, and cross-referenced with information sourced from 
Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, the New York Stock Exchange, and Nasdaq. The final sample, outlined in 
Appendix 1 is comprised of 4,310 firms from 36 different countries: 3,624 domestic firms, 471 Level 1 
firms, and 215 Rule 144a firms. From my original cross-listed sample of firms, I classify firms 
according to their first depositary receipt level, and classify simultaneous Level 1/Portal ‘listings’ as 
Level 1 issues. 
I outline in Appendix 1, the number of non-cross-listed firms, and the number of cross-listed 
firms listed in the United States. I exclude from my final sample firms domiciled in Russia, the Czech 
Republic and Indonesia because of a lack of data. I provide the percentage that each country 
contributes to each depositary receipt level and adopt an identical approach for my non-cross-listed 
sample. The majority of our non-cross-listed sample is domiciled in the U.K. There also exists a 
sizable difference across countries in their contribution to each depositary receipt level. For example, 
Hong Kong, Australia, U.K., and South Africa provide the majority of Level 1 issues, with 97 
(20.59%), 61 (12.95%), 51 (10.83%), and 37 (7.86%) programs, respectively. Together, they supply 
52.23% of the entire sample of Level 1 firms. In contrast, Argentina and Taiwan provide none. Similar 
trends are observed for private placement issues. The majority of these firms originate in India (50), 
Taiwan (42), and South Korea (21). Belgium, Denmark, Israel, Malaysia, and New Zealand provide no 
firm. 
I follow DKS (2004), and HKZ (2007) and employ Tobin’s q to measure firm value, where 
Tobin’s q is defined book value of debt + market capitalization
book value of assets
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  where book value of debt is calculated as 
book value total assets less the book value of equity. All variables are expressed in local currency, 
sourced from Worldscope and are collected on the 31st of December in each year from 1990 to 2003. 
                                                 
1 In a recent paper, like HKZ (2007), I find that the greatest valuation gains to exchange cross listing accrue to firms from high-disclosure regimes (See 
O’Connor (2007)). HKZ (2007) hypothesize that this result is primarily driven by the greater costs faced by low-disclosure firms in their efforts to 
comply with U.S. GAAP. This paper differs from HKZ (2007) in two respects. First, I pay special attention towards examining non-exchange firms (i.e. 
Level 1 and Rule 144a issues). In their analysis, HKZ (2007) do not examine the valuation effects for these firms separately. They create two dummy 
variables: ‘XLIST’ that takes the value of 1 if the firms cross-lists in the U.S., and ‘ORG_EXC_XLIST’ which is 1 if the firm exchange cross-lists. 
Second, I estimate both cross-sectional and panel regressions. 
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I employ the following firm-level control variables in my empirical specifications: I use the 
average sales growth over the last two years (geometric average) and Global Industry q to account for 
firm and industry growth, respectively. Based upon primary standard industry classifications, the 
(yearly) mean Global Industry q is calculated as the average q of all global firms within each 
classification. I employ over 15,000 international firms from the Worldscope database to calculate the 
mean Global Industry q for each year. To remove the influence of outliers, I remove the top 1% of 
observations for Tobin’s q, two-year average sales growth, and total assets. 
Finally, I include La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifler, and Vishny (1998) country-level 
governance variables in order to examine the valuation effects of listing across different governance 
regimes. I employ legal origin (English Common, French, Scandinavian and German Civil Law), and 
anti-director rights index, an equally weighted index of 6 different shareholder rights, which ranges 
from a low of 0 to a high of 5. The country-level governance variables are outlined by country in 
Appendix 2. 
 
 
3.  Empirical Results 
This section presents the main results on cross listing and firm value. I begin by estimating the cross 
listing premium/discount for Level 1/Rule 144a firms in 1997 (as DKS (2004) do). In unreported 
results, I also estimate this cross-sectional relation in 2000 as HKZ (2007) do. The results are outlined 
in Table 1. I then proceed to analyse the relationship over time. To do so, I present univariate 
comparisons of cross-listed to non-cross-listed firms in calendar and event time. The results are 
presented in Table 2. Next, I estimate multivariate/panel data regressions that span the period from 
1990 to 2003. Finally, in Table 4, I examine the dynamics of firm value around the time of listing. 
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Table 1: Cross-Sectional Estimates of the Cross-Listing Premium in 1997. 
 
 Level 1 & Rule 144a Level 1 Rule 144a 
 OLS TE & 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) TE 2SLS TE 2SLS 
2.85 2.60 2.60 2.58 2.63 0.02 0.07 0.20 0.15 Constant [5.81]*** [4.93]*** [4.88]*** [3.85]*** [4.92]*** [0.11] [0.34] [0.92] [0.52] 
0.28 0.23 0.21 -0.33 -0.01 -1.28 -2.91   Level 1 [3.16]*** [2.65]** [1.85]* [3.85]*** [0.11] [4.61]*** [6.56]***   
0.01 0.03 0.19 -0.43 -0.26   -5.29 -7.66 Rule 144a [0.09] [0.14] [0.75] [3.06]*** [1.40]   [6.17]*** [5.41]*** 
  0.01       Level 1 * Years   [0.15]       
  -0.06       Rule 144a * Years   [1.08]       
   1.20      Level 1 * High Rq    [6.69]***      
   1.31      Rule 144a * High Rq    [7.92]***      
    0.22     Level 1 * High Rq * Years     [4.87]***     
    0.34     Rule144a * High Rq * Years     [4.91]***     
0.75 0.70 0.69 0.65 0.67 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.79 Global q [5.44]*** [5.07]*** [5.04]*** [4.77]*** [4.91]*** [8.70]*** [6.96]*** [6.82]*** [5.66]*** 
1.22 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.23 1.48 1.50 1.39 1.72 Sales Growth [3.67]*** [3.51]*** [3.51]*** [3.48]*** [3.47]*** [9.35]*** [7.87]*** [6.91]*** [6.38]*** 
-0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13     Log (Total Assets) [6.56]*** [6.61]*** [6.46]*** [6.37]*** [6.52]***     
 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.10 Anti-Director  [3.29]*** [3.34]*** [3.48]*** [3.42]*** [8.12]*** [7.93]*** [5.88]*** [3.61]*** 
     0.71  2.34  Lambda      [5.18]***  [6.17]***  
#Obs (Firms) 2,467 2,467 2,467 2,467 2,467 2,467 2,467 2,467 2,467 
R-Squared 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.14 - - - - 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 
Prob>Chi - - - - - 0.000 - 0.000 - 
In this table, I report regression (cross-section) estimates of the impact of listing on firm value in 1997. In columns 1-5, I estimate ordinary least squares 
estimates with standard errors clustered at the country level. In the remaining columns I estimate treatment effects (two-stage) and two-stage least squares 
estimates. I proxy for value using Tobin’s q. All variables are defined in the text. 
***, **, and * denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
3.1. Cross-Sectional Estimates of the Cross-Listing Premium 
In Table 1, I present regression estimates of the impact of listing on the value of Level 1/Rule 144a 
firms. I present three sets of estimates: in columns (1-6), I present ordinary least squares estimates. In 
the remaining columns, I explicitly control for self-selection bias, and estimate treatment effects and 
two-stage least squares estimates, respectively. To conserve space, I have outlined the treatment effect 
methodology in greater detail in Appendix 3. In effect, I correct the ordinary least squares estimates for 
selection-bias, and estimate the following: 
i i i iq X CL λ= α + β+ δ + δ λ + ε  (1) 
Where q is Tobin’s q, iX  is a vector of firm and country level controls, CL  is a standard 0/1 
dummy, corresponding to either a Level 1 over-the-counter issue, or a privately placed Rule 144a issue 
(the treatment effects and two-stage least squares are estimated separately for each cross-listed sub-set 
of firms), iλ  is the inverse-mills ratio, generated from a first-stage probit model2 (i.e. proxy for 
unobserved/private information), and iε  is a standard error term. 
The results from Table 1 suggest the following. First, the ordinary least squares estimates 
presented in columns (1-2) suggest that Level 1 firms, unlike Rule 144a firms are worth more than 
non-cross-listed firms. In both columns, the coefficient estimate on the Level 1 dummy is large, and 
                                                 
2 The inverse-mills ratios i.e. for both Level 1 and Rule 144a firms are generated from a first-stage probit, whereby I model the decision to cross-list as a 
function of firm size (log of total assets (US$)), and legal origin. The results from the first-stage probit are available from the author upon request. To 
satisfy the exclusion restrictions, size is excluded from the second-stage selection-corrected valuation regression. The two-stage least squares estimates 
are generated using the same first-stage criteria. 
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statistically different from zero. However, absent a self-selection correction, it is not clear whether this 
valuation premium is a cross-listing premium. I examine this issue in the remaining columns of Table 
1. In contrast, the corresponding coefficient estimate for Rule 144a firms is small, and indifferent from 
zero. For Level 1 firms, the valuation premium is robust to the inclusion of firm, industry, and country-
level control variables. In column 2, with all firm, industry, and control variables included, the 
coefficient on the Level 1 dummy is a statistically significant 0.23. The firm, industry, and control 
controls are all of the correct sign, and statistically different from zero. Firm value is increasing in firm 
and industry growth, and level of investor protection (anti-director rights). Larger firms tend to worth 
less. 
However the ordinary least squares estimates are biased (See Appendix 3). In the remaining 
columns of Table 1, I control for the endogeneity of the cross-listing decision, and estimate treatment 
effects and two-stage least squares estimates. In the treatment effects regressions, I include, along with 
the firm (excluding size), industry, and country controls, a proxy for unobservable/private information 
i.e. the inverse mills ratio. The inclusion of the inverse-mills ratio dramatically affects the coefficient 
estimates on both cross-listing dummies. For both Level 1 and Rule 144a firms, the cross-listing 
dummy variables are both negative, and statistically different from zero. For Level 1 firms, the 
inclusion of the inverse mills ratio reverses the sign on the cross-listing dummy from positive to 
negative. In short, the positive sign seen in the ordinary least squares estimates are soaked up by the 
coefficient for the inverse mills ratio. However, of concern here is the flip in sign of the cross-listing 
dummy variables. For robustness sake, I also present two-stage least squares estimates. Consistent with 
the treatment effects estimates, when I control for the endogeneity of the listing decision, the 
coefficient estimates on both cross-listing dummies are now negative, and statistically so .3 
Interestingly, the coefficient estimate on the inverse mills ratio is positive and statistically different 
from zero for both sub-sets of firms. This implies that those unobservable factors that influence the 
decision to list, impact positively on firm value. However, once we account for this, there is no cross-
listing premium. In fact, the results suggest the opposite, a cross listing discount. 
Next, I examine whether the quality of firms that list abroad has any impact on post-listing 
value. For example, one might expect that higher quality firms would reap greater benefits from listing 
in the U.S. I classify cross-listed firms as high quality firms, if they are worth more than their 
corresponding (domestic) non-cross-listed firm on the year of listing. To dos o, I use Relative Tobin’s 
q. Relative q is calculated as q of cross-listed firm
mean q of domestic firms
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, where a Relative q of greater than 1 suggests 
that the cross-listed firm is worth more than their average counterpart non-cross-listed domestic firm. 
A Relative q of less than 1 suggests the opposite. To shed some light on the relationship, I begin by 
outlining the unconditional relationship between Relative q on the list year, and post-listing Relative q. 
The data is calculated on a country-by-country basis, and is presented in a series of scatter plots (See 
Figure 2). The country-by-country data is outlined in Appendix 2. For both sets of firms, the 
relationship is positive: it appears that firms that are worth more on the list year continue to be worth 
more after listing. Next, I examine whether this relationship is robust to the inclusion of firm, industry, 
and country controls. To examine this, I create a simple dummy variable that is 1 if the firm is worth 
more than their counterpart domestic firms on the list year, and interact these with the cross-listing 
dummy variables. The results are presented in column 4 of Table 1. First, I find that the coefficient 
estimates on the interaction terms (i.e. Level 1 * High Rq, Rule 144a * High Rq) are positive and 
statistically significant form zero. However, with the inclusion of the interaction terms, the coefficient 
estimates on the Level 1 and Rule 144a dummies are now negative, and statistically different from 
zero. Taken together, the results suggest that it is only those firms that are more highly valued that gain 
from listing in the U.S. 
                                                 
3 Notice also that the constant is statistically different from zero in all of the ordinary least squares regression estimates, suggesting that missing variables 
may have an important influence on the results. However, when I include the IMR, the intercept terms are smaller, and no longer statistically different 
from zero. 
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Figure 1: Cross-Listing Premium/Discount and Average Years of Listing in 1997 
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Figure 2: Relative q on List Year and Average Post-Listing Relative q 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, before I proceed to the longitudinal analysis, I use the cross-sectional estimates to make 
an initial attempt to examine the dynamics of corporate value, post-listing. In order to do so, I calculate 
for each firm, the number of years that each firm is listed in the U.S. in 1997. I denote this variable as 
‘Years’. To examine the behaviour of firm value in the post-listing period, I interact this variable with 
each cross-listing dummy variable creating, Level 1 * Years, and Rule 144a * Years, respectively. The 
results are presented in column 3 of Table 1, and suggest the following. First, the coefficient estimates 
suggest a slightly upward (downward) trend in value post-listing for Level 1 (Rule 144a) firms, 
although both sets of estimates are statistically different from zero. In contrast, I find that for firms that 
are worth more, the post-listing period is synonymous with an upward trend for both sets of firms. The 
coefficient estimates on the interaction terms ‘Level 1 * High Rq * Years’ and ‘Rule 144a * High Rq * 
Years’ are positive and different from zero. 
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The results thus far suggest the following. First, after controlling for self-selection bias, Level 1 
and Rule 144a firms are worth less after trading in the U.S. Once we control for ‘positive’ 
unobservable/private information, the coefficient estimates on both the Level 1 and Rule 144a 
dummies, are negative, and statistically so. Next, I find that only those firms that are worth more on the 
list year gain from trading in the U.S. as non-exchange issues. Furthermore, their value continues to 
increase after trading in the U.S. 
 
3.2. Year-By-Year and Event Time Valuation Comparisons 
In Table 2 (Panel A) I compare the value of cross-listed firms to non-cross-listed firms in each year 
from 1990 to 2003. For each subset of cross-listed firms, I outline the value of the mean and median 
firm in each year. In the remaining columns, I outline the mean and median adjusted Relative q 
measure. The mean/median Relative q is calculated as q of cross-listed firm
mean or median q of domestic firms
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. The 
conclusions drawn from Panel A (and B) are largely dependent on how the Relative q measure is 
calculated. In general, when I compare cross-listed firms to the median non-cross-listed firms, cross-
listed firms (both Level 1 and Rule 144a) are worth more than non-cross-listed firms. For example, 
using median-adjusted q, Level 1 firms are worth statistically more than domestic firms in every year, 
with the largest valuation difference originating in 1993. Rule 144a firms are worth more than the 
median domestic firm in all but one calendar year (1990). 
 
Table 2: Comparison of Cross-Listed to Non-Cross-Listed Firms 
 
 Level 1 Rule 144a 
 Mean Median Mean-Adj 
Relative q 
Median-Adj 
Relative q 
Mean Median Mean-Adj 
Relative q 
Median-Adj 
Relative q 
Panel A Calendar Time 
1990 1.62 1.53 0.96 1.08* 1.03 1.03 0.86* 0.87** 
1991 1.66 1.49 0.96 1.06* 1.22 1.17 0.92* 1.00 
1992 1.79 1.52 1.05 1.15*** 1.72 1.50 0.96 1.10** 
1993 1.98 1.82 1.04 1.19*** 1.73 1.62 0.89 1.04* 
1994 2.02 1.72 1.04 1.16*** 2.52 2.21 1.01 1.21*** 
1995 1.85 1.62 1.02 1.15*** 1.93 1.83 0.96 1.14*** 
1996 1.85 1.59 0.99 1.16*** 1.76 1.53 0.94** 1.13*** 
1997 1.89 1.60 0.95* 1.14*** 1.85 1.58 0.94* 1.14*** 
1998 1.60 1.36 0.96*** 1.15*** 1.56 1.30 0.88*** 1.09** 
1999 1.70 1.45 0.91*** 1.14*** 1.73 1.38 0.89*** 1.17*** 
2000 1.68 1.40 0.89*** 1.17*** 1.76 1.32 0.96*** 1.26*** 
2001 1.53 1.32 0.91** 1.15*** 1.42 1.23 0.92*** 1.12*** 
2002 1.53 1.36 0.92* 1.13*** 1.46 1.27 0.91*** 1.09** 
2003 1.63 1.45 0.89* 1.12*** 1.58 1.38 0.92*** 1.11*** 
Panel B Event Time 
 Mean Median Mean-Adj 
Relative q 
Median-Adj 
Relative q 
Mean Median Mean-Adj 
Relative q 
Median-Adj 
Relative q 
-5 2.17 1.71 1.15 1.33*** 1.65 1.33 0.90 1.02 
-4 2.09 1.67 1.06 1.30*** 1.59 1.33 0.89 1.02 
-3 1.99 1.61 1.07 1.26*** 1.86 1.53 0.98 1.14*** 
-2 1.97 1.61 1.06 1.28*** 2.17 1.72 1.09 1.25*** 
-1 1.98 1.60 1.05 1.27*** 2.14 1.64 1.03 1.24*** 
0 1.89 1.58 1.03 1.23*** 2.18 1.86 1.07 1.27*** 
1 1.78 1.53 0.98 1.16*** 1.96 1.70 1.05 1.22*** 
2 1.78 1.53 0.95 1.14*** 1.82 1.48 0.97 1.18*** 
3 1.73 1.46 0.95 1.14*** 1.68 1.43 0.92 1.13*** 
4 1.70 1.45 0.96 1.15*** 1.58 1.30 0.90 1.13*** 
5 1.62 1.38 0.92 1.11*** 1.58 1.28 0.87 1.14*** 
Event Time (Before-After) 
 Mean Median Mean-adj 
Relative q 
Median-adj 
Relative q 
Mean Median Mean-adj 
Relative q 
Median-adj 
Relative q 
Before 1.94 1.62 1.06 1.25 1.86 1.37 0.98 1.13 
After 1.70 1.47 0.94 1.14 1.67 1.37 0.93 1.14 
Difference (0.24)*** (0.15)*** (0.12)*** (0.11)*** (0.19)*** 0.00 (0.05)** 0.01 
In this table, I compare the value of cross-listed to non-cross-listed firms in calendar and event time. For cross-listed firms, I present the mean and median 
value. To compare cross-listed to non-cross-listed firms, I calculate the mean and median adjusted relative q measure. Both measures are calculated as the 
value of each cross-listed firm divided by the mean (median) value of non-cross-listed firms. I proxy for value using Tobin’s q. In the remaining rows, I 
calculate value pre and post-listing. 
***, **, and * denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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I compare in Table 2 (Panel B), the value of cross-listed firms to non-cross-listed firms in event 
time. I denote the list year as ‘0’, and compare cross-listed to non-cross-listed firms for the five years 
before to five years after listing. As before, I outline the mean and median adjusted Relative q measure. 
To complement these numbers, I present in Figures 3-4, the mean and median value of cross-listed 
firms, and the mean/median adjusted Relative q. As before, the conclusions drawn are largely 
contingent on the valuation adjustment employed. Using median-adjusted q, both sets of firms are 
worth more in every period around the list year. However, irrespective of the adjustment method 
employed, the trends in value around the time of listing remain the same. Prior to trading in the U.S., 
the value of Level 1 firms falls in almost every period leading up to the list year. Value continues to 
fall post-listing, although the magnitude of the decline is much smaller. On a median-adjusted basis, 
Level 1 firms, do, nevertheless continue to be worth more than domestic firms (although not on a 
mean-adjusted basis). Finally, the data presented in Table 2 (Panel B) suggest that Rule 144a firms 
‘time’ their listing in the U.S. Rule 144a firms experience a sizable run-up in value prior to listing in 
the U.S. This is followed by a corresponding fall-off, post-listing. On a median-adjusted basis, around 
the time of listing, Rule 144a firms continue to be worth more than domestic firms, and the greatest 
valuation difference occurs on the year of listing. 
 
Figure 3: Absolute and Relative Value of Level 1 Firms in Event Time 
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Figure 4: Absolute and Relative Value of Rule 144a Firms in Event Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The last three rows of Panel B summarize the value of firms subsequent to cross listing. Level 1 
firms are worth less after listing in the U.S., both on an absolute and relative basis. The average Rule 
144a firm is worth less, but shows no change on a median-adjusted basis. 
In summary, the results from Table 2 suggest the following. First, on a median-adjusted basis, 
Level 1 and Rule 144a firms are worth more than domestic firms in almost every calendar period. 
Around the time of listing, both sets of firms continue to be worth more than domestic firms. The value 
of Level 1 firms falls around the time of listing, but the greatest fall in value is experienced pre-listing. 
Rule 144a firms ‘time’ their listing in the U.S. However, these univariate comparisons do not control 
for other factors that influence firm value. In the next section, I outline multivariate panel regressions. 
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3.3. Panel Regression Estimates of the Cross Listing Premium 
In this section I examine the effect of cross listing on firm value. I begin with the following 
specification, whereby I model firm value as a function of firm characteristics: 
it it 1 it 2 it itq X Level 1 Rule 144a u= α + β+ δ + δ +  (2) 
Where itX  is a set of exogenous observable characteristics of the firm, itLevel 1 , and itRule 144a  
are standard dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the firm trades in the United States as a Level 
1, or as a privately placed Rule 144a issue on Portal, respectively. itu  is a standard idiosyncratic 
disturbance term, and 1 2{ , , , }α β δ δ  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
I explicitly acknowledge the non-randomness of the cross-listed sample, and model their 
decision to cross list as follows: 
* * *
it it it it it it itCL Z ,CL 1 if CL 0,CL 0 if CL 0= γ +η = > = <  (3) 
Where *itCL  ( it it itLevel 1 ,Rule 144a CL∈ ) is an unobserved latent variable, itZ  is a set of 
observable firm-level characteristics that determine the decision to cross-list in the United States, and 
itη  is a disturbance term. Selection bias arises because of the correlation between it itLevel 1 ,Rule 144a  
and itu . This correlation can arise in two instances i.e. (1) selection on observables which arises 
through correlation between itZ  and itu ,or (2) through selection on unobservables i.e. correlation 
between itη  and itu . Both instances render ordinary least squares estimates of the effect of cross listing 
on value, biased. 
In my analysis, I estimate the effect of listing on firm value using two approaches. First, I 
estimate a variant of the standard firm-fixed effect regression. Specifically, I estimate a pooled 
ordinary least squares regression, with unobserved heterogeneity specified as Mundlak (1978) 
correction terms i.e. time averages of time-variant explanatory variables over time 
(
T
i i i i it
s 1
1X a , where X X
T =
α = ζ + = ∑ ) 4.I do not estimate a firm-fixed effects model as I find that the 
assumption that strict exogeneity holds is violated .5 Consequently, I estimate the following: 
it it 1 it 2 it 3 it i itq X Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a X= α + β+ δ + δ + δ + ζ +μ  (4) 
Next, I explicitly model for unobservables by proxying for them. To do so I estimate a 
treatment effects model, whereby I augment the second stage equation with a selection correction term 
namely the inverse mills ratio, from a first-stage probit model. The inverse mills ratios are generated on 
a year-by-year basis (using yearly probit models), thus resulting in a series of time-variant 
unobservables in the second stage equation. Consequently, I estimate: 
it it 1 1 it 1 2 i itq X C c= α + β + δ + λ β + + υ  (5) 
I outline this method in greater detail in Appendix 3. The coefficient estimates corresponding to 
Eqs (4-5) are presented in Table 3. In Table 3, I replicate much of the analysis that I originally 
examined in a cross-sectional setting in Table 1. 
                                                 
4 The Mundlak (1978) correction terms are included in all pooled ordinary least squares regressions, but to conserve space, they are not reported. They 
are available form the author upon request. However, I do report the p-value from a standard F-stat that tests whether they are jointly different from 
zero.  
5 Violations of strict exogeneity are likely in this case because of feedback effects i.e. from Tobin’s q to future values of the cross-listing dummy 
variables. I formally test for this possibility, following Wooldridge (2002), by inserting the one-year forwarded cross-listing variables as independent 
variables and testing whether their coefficients are jointly equal to zero. The results suggest that the assumption of strict exogeneity holds is violated.  
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Table 3: Panel Regression Estimates of the Cross-Listing Premium. 
 
 Level 1 & Rule 144a Treatment Effects 
 POLS Level 1 Rule 144a 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
0.16 0.20 0.01 0.09 0.51 0.17 0.22 0.02 -0.06 0.10 -0.33 Level 1 
[2.76]*** [2.89]*** [0.12] [1.51] [3.59]*** [2.97]*** [3.11]*** [0.28] [0.83] [1.00] [6.46]*** 
0.02 0.18[ -0.25 -0.04] 0.46       Rule 144a 
[0.24] [1.90]* [4.76]*** [0.65] [2.42]***       
 -0.02     -0.02     Level 1 * Years 
 [1.08]     [1.15]     
  0.42     0.41    Level 1 * Rel q 
  [3.68]***     [3.70]***    
   0.04        Level 1 * Relq * Years 
   [2.63]***        
    -0.10       Level 1 * ADR 
    [2.54]***       
 -0.05        -0.04  Rule 144a * Years 
 [2.83]***        [2.6]***  
  0.51        0.53 Rule 144a * Rel q 
  [4.78]***        [5.01]*** 
   0.04        Rule 144a * Relq * Years 
   [1.80]*        
    -0.14       Rule 144a * ADR 
    [2.47]***       
0.60 0.59 0.60 0.54 0.54 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.69 0.68 0.69 Sales Growth 
[7.36]*** [7.29]*** [7.43]*** [6.89]*** [6.86]*** [9.4]*** [9.3]*** [9.3]*** [8.2]*** [8.2]*** [8.25]*** 
-0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.14 -0.14       Log (Total Assets) 
[10.4]*** [10.4]*** [10.26]*** [9.81]*** [9.84]***       
0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.74 0.74[11.6]*** Global Industry q 
[11.5]*** [11.4]*** [11.4]*** [11.37]*** [11.29]*** [11.0]*** [11.0]*** [11.0]*** [11.6]*** [11.6]***  
0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.10 Anti-Director Rights 
[11.4]*** [11.5]*** [11.5]*** [11.47]*** [12.07]*** [13.3]*** [13.3]*** [13.3]*** [10.0]*** [10.1]*** [10.2]*** 
- - - - - 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.15 0.15 0.15 Lambda 
     [10.5]*** [10.5]*** [10.3]*** [8.7]*** [8.6]*** [8.61]*** 
Time Dummies No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Ave (Mundlak) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Prob>F (Mundlak) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - - - - - 
# Obs (Firms) 4,310 4,310 4,310 4,310 4,310 4,310 4,310 4,310 4,310 4,310 4,310 
R-Squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.111 0.111 0.114 0.102 0.103 0.105 
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First, in both the pooled ordinary least squares and treatment effect regressions (See Columns 1 
and 6), the coefficient estimate on the Level 1 dummy is positive and statistically different from zero. 
In contrast, Rule 144a firms are not worth more. Like before, I find that the coefficient estimate 
(Lambda) on the IMR is positive, and statistically different for both sets of firms. Next, I examine the 
dynamics of firm value in the post-listing period. As in Table 1, I interact each cross-listing dummy 
variable with ‘Years’, which denotes the number of years each firm is listed in the U.S., in each cross-
sectional period. The coefficient estimates are outlined in Columns 2, 7, and 10. Unlike the results 
presented in Table 1, the results now suggest that a Level 1 issue is associated with a fall in value, post-
listing, albeit insignificantly so. Rule 144a firms experience an even greater downward trend in value, 
which is statistically different to zero. In Table 4, I return to this issue, and examine the short and long-
term valuation gains from listing. 
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Table 4: Evolution of Tobin’s q by legal characteristics. 
 
 Level 1 
 All All: Relative q Anti-Director Rights Legal Origin 
  Mean-Adj Median-Adj Above Median Below Median English 
Common 
Civil Law 
0.27 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.30 0.11 0.33 List year 
[3.01]*** [3.61]*** [3.37]*** [1.94]* [1.98]** [1.01] [2.31]** 
0.19 0.13 0.12 0.24 0.05 0.26 -0.03 1 year after list 
[2.19]** [3.36]*** [2.51]** [1.97]** [0.48] [1.91]* [0.42] 
0.20 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.27 0.15 0.14 2 years after list 
[2.19]** [2.90]*** [2.61]*** [0.94] [1.78]* [1.13] [1.38] 
0.08 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.09 3 years after list 
[0.96] [1.77]* [1.42] [0.01] [1.19] [0.00] [0.80] 
0.14 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.17 0.07 0.11 4 years after list 
[1.53] [2.47]** [2.13]** [0.67] [1.42] [0.53] [0.85] 
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.08 5 years after list 
[0.79] [1.70]* [1.25] [0.26] [0.63] [0.06] [0.71] 
0.18 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.31 0.05 0.28 > 5 years after list 
[2.15]** [2.00]** [2.04]** [0.78] [2.44]** [0.41] [2.25]** 
0.77 0.34 0.45 0.77 0.68 0.71 0.79 Global Industry q 
[11.80]*** [11.15]*** [10.97]*** [8.46]*** [7.65]*** [5.23]*** [10.82]*** 
0.49 0.28 0.30 0.39 0.79 0.35 0.48 Sales growth 
[6.18]*** [6.67]*** [5.86]*** [3.32]*** [7.34]*** [2.55]** [4.91]*** 
-0.13 -0.15 -0.14 -0.19 -0.12 -0.18 -0.10 Total Assets 
[8.86]*** [14.61]*** [11.05]*** [8.24]*** [6.97]*** [5.80]*** [6.26]*** 
Time Dummies No No No No No No No 
# Obs (Firms) 4,310 4,310 4,310 2,172 2,138 1,490 2,820 
2R  0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.10 
Pr F>  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pr F(Mundlak)>  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Rule 144a 
 All All: Relative q Anti-Director Rights Legal Origin 
  Mean-Adj Median-Adj Above Median Below Median English 
Common 
Civil Law 
0.18 0.04 0.01 0.47 0.20 0.54 0.07 List year 
[1.42] [0.84] [0.12] [1.36] [1.80]* [1.49] [0.64] 
0.13 0.11 0.09 -0.27 0.37 -0.07 0.20 1 year after list 
[1.22] [1.87]* [1.28] [1.48] [2.91]*** [0.32] [1.60] 
0.10 0.05 0.06 -0.34 0.35 -0.29 0.21 2 years after list 
[0.94] [1.00] [1.00] [2.52]*** [2.75]*** [1.94]* [1.68]* 
-0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.39 0.21 -0.37 0.08 3 years after list 
[0.53] [0.42] [0.48] [3.76]*** [2.31]** [3.13]*** [0.86] 
0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.21 0.17 -0.14 0.04 4 years after list 
[0.01] [0.68] [0.53] [1.46] [1.33] [0.85] [0.33] 
0.07 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.16 0.00 5 years after list 
[0.47] [0.35] [1.01] [0.11] [1.02] [0.47] [0.04] 
-0.16 -0.07 -0.05 -0.25 -0.07 -0.14 -0.19 > 5 years after list 
[2.31]** [2.08]** [1.05] [1.95]* [1.02] [1.03] [2.91]*** 
0.76 0.34 0.44 0.76 0.67 0.70 0.78 Global Industry q 
[11.75]*** [11.10]*** [10.94]*** [8.34]*** [7.58]*** [5.20]*** [10.75]*** 
0.49 0.28 0.30 0.40 0.76 0.34 0.47 Sales growth 
[6.19]*** [6.66]*** [5.85]*** [3.44]*** [7.10]*** [2.51]*** [4.82]*** 
-0.13 -0.15 -0.14 -0.19 -0.13 -0.18 -0.10 Total Assets 
[8.61]*** [14.71]*** [10.95]*** [8.00]*** [7.16]*** [5.55]*** [6.23]*** 
Time Dummies No No No No No No No 
# Obs (Firms) 4,310 4,310 4,310 2,172 2,138 1,490 2,820 
2R  0.09 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.09 
Pr F>  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pr F(Mundlak)>  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
197 International Research Journal of Finance and Economics - Issue 25 (2009) 
Next, I examine whether better quality firms perform better. As before, I classify better firms, 
as those that are worth more than their counterpart domestic firms on the year of listing. The results are 
outlined in Columns 3, 8, and 11. In line with the coefficient estimates presented in Table 1, I find that 
better quality Level 1 and Rule 144a firms gain the most from trading in the U.S. As before, the 
inclusion of the interaction terms dramatically reduces the coefficient estimates on the Level 1 and 
Rule 144a dummy variables. The coefficient estimate on the Level 1 dummy is smaller (0.01), and no 
longer statistically different from zero. The corresponding coefficient estimate on the Rule 144a 
dummy is negative, and statistically different from zero. Using the interaction terms ‘Level 1 * Rel q * 
Years, Rule 144a * Rel q * Years’, I find that the value of these firms continues to increase post-listing. 
However, the gains are greatest for Level 1 firms. 
Finally, I examine the valuation gains to listing by the level of domestic investor protection. 
HKZ (2007) find in a series of Logit models that while firms from low-disclosure regimes are more 
likely to cross-list, they are less likely to exchange cross-list i.e. a Level 2/3 issue as opposed to a Level 
1/Rule 144a issue. While the decision on the part of these firms not to list as a Level 2/3 issue is 
undoubtedly related to the costs associated with the initial and ongoing costs associated with exchange-
traded issues, it may also be the case that these firms from low-disclosure regimes experience the 
greatest gains from non-exchange trading in the U.S. I examine this issue in Column 5 of Table 3. 
Here, I create an interaction dummy variable, whereby I interact each cross-listing dummy with LLSV 
(2000) anti-director rights measure. The anti-director rights measure for each country is outlined in 
Appendix 1. The coefficient estimates are consistent across both sub-sets of cross-listed firms. Level 1 
and Rule 144a firms from low-disclosure regimes experience the greatest gains from listing in the U.S. 
With the inclusion of the interaction terms, the coefficient estimates on the Level 1 and Rule 144a 
dummies are positive and statistically different from zero. The corresponding coefficient estimates on 
the interaction terms is negative, and statistically different from zero. In all specifications, the control 
variables are of the correct sign and statistically different from zero. Firm value increases with investor 
rights, and firm and industry growth. As expected, larger firms are worth less. 
In summary, the results from Table 3 highlight the following. First, I find that Level 1 firms 
experience a cross listing premium. Upon further investigation, it appears that this premium manifests 
for, first high quality firms i.e. firms worth more than domestic firms, and second, Level 1 issues from 
low-disclosure regimes. These results manifest also for privately placed Rule 144a issues. The results 
for low-disclosure regime firms suggests that their decision not to trade as a Level 2/3 issue is justified, 
especially given the findings of HKZ (2007). Their analysis suggests that high-disclosure regime firms 
gain the most from trading as Level 2/3 issues. The authors hypothesis that given the costs of listing for 
low-disclosure regime firms (which are considerably greater on a relative basis), the benefits to listing 
may not be sufficient to meet these costs. In the next section, I examine the post-listing valuation gains 
to listing for these firms. Specifically, I want to examine the dynamics of value post-listing. For 
example, are the gains immediate, or do they materialize later? And if so, are the gains permanent? 
Rather than just interact the ‘Level 1 * ADR, Rule 144a * ADR’ dummies with the ‘Years’ variable, I 
undertake a more informative test. 
Specifically, I create a series of individual event-year post-listing dummy variables. I create 7 
individual event-year dummies; one for each post-listing year (including the List year) up to five years 
post-listing, and a final dummy (> 5 years after listing), which is designed to measure, any potential 
long-term valuation gains to listing. These single year event-year specific dummies are 1 on the 
referred year and zero otherwise. The reference year is the pre-listing period. I present results for the 
full sample of firms (All), using mean and median-adjusted q, by level of investor protection (using 
anti-director rights measure), and finally, by legal origin (See Appendix 1 for the legal origin of each 
country). Table 4 contains the results. 
The results for Level 1 firms suggest the following. For the full sample of firms, it appears that 
there are immediate valuation gains to listing, which disappear after the second year of listing, but 
manifest later into a permanent cross-listing premium. The ‘List year’, ‘1 Year after list’ and ‘2 years 
after list’ dummy variables are 0.27, 0.19, and 0.20, respectively, and are all significantly different 
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from zero. In contrast, for the next three event years i.e. ‘1 Year after list’, ‘2 years after list’, and ‘3 
years after list’ are smaller, and statistically insignificant from zero. However, I find that a long-term 
permanent cross-listing premium manifests. The coefficient estimate on the ‘> 5 years after list’ 
dummy is 0.18, and is statistically different from zero at a conventional level. The mean and median-
adjusted q measures are broadly in line with the absolute q measure. Next, and consistent with the 
findings documented in Table 3, the valuation gains are concentrated amongst firms from low-
disclosure regimes. For example, when I classify firms in accordance with their level of domestic 
investor protection, firms from high-disclosure regimes (i.e. above-median anti-director rights), the 
valuation gains to listing are short-lived. After the first year of listing, the cross listing premium 
disappears for these firms. In contrast, for low-disclosure domiciled Level 1 firms, the results are in 
line with those documented for the entire sample; immediate valuation gains, which dissipate after 2 
years of listing, but manifest again into a permanent cross listing premium. The coefficient estimate on 
the‘> 5 years after list’ dummy is a statistically significant 0.31. I reach almost identical conclusions, 
when I characterize firms as either English common or civil law domiciled. 
Finally, the results for Rule 144a firms are outlined in the bottom panel of Table 4. For the full 
sample of firms, I find that there are no gains to listing in any of the 5 years after listing. In each event 
period, the coefficient estimates are statistically no different to zero. However, there is a long-term 
cross listing discount: the coefficient estimate on the ‘> 5 years after list’ dummy is –0.16 and 
statistically different to zero. The mean-adjusted relative q figures support this view. The results by 
level of investor protection/legal origin are outlined in the remaining columns. Interestingly, and unlike 
Level 1 issues, I find no long-term cross-listing premium. While the valuation gains do accrue to firms 
from low-disclosure regimes, they are immediate, but not long lasting. For example, for below-median 
anti-director rights firms, the valuation gains disappear after three years of listing (Interestingly, when I 
employ legal origin, civil law firms actually experience a long-term cross listing discount). Above-
median firms are never worth more (from a statistical view point) and they experience a cross-listing 
discount i.e. the coefficient estimate on the ‘> 5 years after list’ is a statistically significant –0.25. 
Finally, in all specifications, the controls are of the expected sign, and are different to zero. 
 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
In recent years, the number of non-U.S. firms that have sought a Level 2/3 exchange cross listing in the 
U.S. has fallen. Coupled with this, the number of firms that have delisted from U.S. exchanges has also 
intensified (See Marosi and Massoud (2006), and Witmer (2006)). In contrast, over the same period, a 
non-exchange listing has become a more attractive option for non-U.S. firms, as opposed to a Level 2/3 
list. Furthermore, HKZ (2007) show that firms from low-disclosure regimes tend to prefer a non-
exchange listing in the U.S., despite the fact that, on theoretical grounds, it is these firms that have 
most to gain from an exchange listing. In this paper, I examine the valuation effects of such listing 
choices. 
Using a panel of Level 1 and Rule 144a firms, I show that relative to firms from high-disclosure 
regimes, non-exchange listings for firms from low-disclosure regimes tend to be value enhancing. For 
example, in the case of Level 1 firms from low-disclosure regimes, the valuation gains from listing 
tend to be immediate, and long lasting. In contrast, the valuation gains that accrue to Level 1 firms 
from high-disclosure regimes tend to be short-lived. Finally, I find that the valuation gains from listing 
as a private placement i.e. Rule 144a issue accrue only to those firms from low-disclosure regimes. 
However, these gains tend to be transitory. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Sample Description 
 
  Sample Country Variables 
 Country Domestic % Level 1 % 144a % Sample % Anti- DR Legal Origin 
1 Argentina 20 0.55 0 0.00 5 1.06 25 0.58 4 FCL 
2 Australia 72 1.99 61 12.95 4 0.85 137 3.18 4 ECL 
3 Austria 31 0.86 10 2.12 2 0.42 43 1.00 2 FCL 
4 China 58 1.60 8 1.70 4 0.85 70 1.62 N/A - 
5 Colombia 14 0.39 1 0.21 4 0.85 19 0.44 3 FCL 
6 Denmark 39 1.08 4 0.85 0 0.00 43 1.00 2 SCL 
7 Finland 42 1.16 2 0.42 2 0.42 46 1.07 3 SCL 
8 France 210 5.79 16 3.40 5 1.06 231 5.36 3 FCL 
9 Germany 238 6.57 21 4.46 3 0.64 262 6.08 1 GCL 
10 Greece 3 0.08 1 0.21 2 0.42 6 0.14 2 FCL 
11 Hong Kong 196 5.41 97 20.59 1 0.21 294 6.82 5 ECL 
12 Hungary 5 0.14 2 0.42 8 1.70 15 0.35 N/A - 
13 India 83 2.29 5 1.06 50 10.6 138 3.20 5 ECL 
14 Ireland 1 0.03 1 0.21 1 0.21 3 0.07 4 ECL 
15 Israel 36 0.99 1 0.21 0 0.00 37 0.86 3 ECL 
16 Italy 107 2.95 5 1.06 7 1.49 119 2.76 1 FCL 
17 Japan 635 17.52 23 4.88 0 0.00 658 15.27 4 GCL 
18 Korea 287 7.92 4 0.85 21 4.46 312 7.24 2 GCL 
19 Malaysia 178 4.91 12 2.55 0 0.00 190 4.41 4 ECL 
20 Mexico 31 0.86 18 3.82 11 2.34 60 1.39 1 FCL 
21 Netherlands 57 1.57 15 3.18 2 0.42 74 1.72 2 FCL 
22 Norway 47 1.30 8 1.70 3 0.64 58 1.35 4 SCL 
23 New Zealand 22 0.61 4 0.85 0 0.00 26 0.60 4 ECL 
24 Peru 11 0.30 3 0.64 1 0.21 15 0.35 3 FCL 
25 Phillipines 34 0.94 5 1.06 6 1.27 45 1.04 3 FCL 
26 Poland 17 0.47 1 0.21 11 2.34 29 0.67 N/A - 
27 Portugal 17 0.47 2 0.42 3 0.64 22 0.51 3 FCL 
28 Singapore 111 3.06 19 4.03 1 0.21 131 3.04 4 ECL 
29 South Africa 89 2.46 37 7.86 3 0.64 129 2.99 5 ECL 
30 Spain 71 1.96 4 0.85 2 0.42 77 1.79 4 FCL 
31 Sweden 78 2.15 6 1.27 1 0.21 85 1.97 3 SCL 
32 Switzerland 114 3.15 5 1.06 1 0.21 120 2.78 2 GCL 
33 Taiwan 243 6.71 0 0.00 42 8.92 285 6.61 3 GCL 
34 Thailand 82 2.26 14 2.97 1 0.21 97 2.25 2 ECL 
35 Turkey 34 0.94 5 1.06 7 1.49 46 1.07 2 FCL 
36 U.K  311 8.58 51 10.83 1 0.21 363 8.42 5 ECL 
 Total 3,624 100% 471 100% 215 100% 4,310 100% - - 
In this table I report by country the number of domestic (non-cross-listed), Level 1 and Rule 144a firms. I report by country, the number of domestic, 
Level 1, and Rule 144a firms. For each category of firms, I also calculate the percentage (%) contribution of each country to the overall sample. All firms 
are obtained from the Worldscope Country Lists. All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank of New York, and cross-
referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank. Rule 144a ADRs trade on Portal and Level 1 ADRs trade over-the-counter as 
pink sheet issues. In the remaining columns, I outline La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifler, and Vishny (1998) country level governance variables; anti-
director rights and legal origin. ECL, FCL, GCL, and SCL denote English Common Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law, and Scandinavian Civil 
Law, respectively. 
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Appendix 2: Mean value of Level 1 & Rule 144a firms in 1997 
 
  Level 1 Rule 144a 
 Country Level 1 D (q) Ave # Years List in 1997 
Rel. q on 
List Year 
Rel q post-
listing 
Rule 
144a D (q) 
Ave # Years 
List in 1997 
Rel. q on 
List Year 
Rel q post-
listing 
1 Argentina - - - - - 1.65 (0.09) 3.50 1.10 0.89 
2 Australia 2.21 0.03 5.00 0.99 1.01 2.10 (0.08) 3.25 0.76 0.88 
3 Austria 1.95 0.28 2.33 1.38 1.03 1.65 (0.02) 2.00 1.00 0.77 
4 China 1.16 (0.14) 2.00 0.92 0.89 1.37 0.07 3.25 - 0.93 
5 Colombia - - - 0.78 0.78 1.41 (0.03) 3.00 1.38 1.08 
6 Denmark 1.07 (1.01) 14.00* 1.99 0.98 - - - - - 
7 Finland 1.57 (0.38) 4.00 0.85 0.85 1.48 (0.47) 5.00 0.86 0.78 
8 France 2.07 0.03 3.29 1.36 1.18 2.07 0.03 2.25 0.61 0.62 
9 Germany 1.41 (0.38) 2.00 0.91 0.80 2.08 0.29 2.00 1.31 0.90 
10 Greece - - - - 0.75 - - - 1.09 1.11 
11 Hong Kong 1.94 (0.13) 3.42 1.01 0.92 - - - 0.89 1.23 
12 Hungary 2.47 0.49 5.00 1.80 1.01 2.86 0.88 1.33 1.18 1.23 
13 India 3.49 1.29 4.00 1.33 1.18 1.56 (0.64) 2.80 0.94 0.72 
14 Ireland 1.34 (0.44) 2.00 0.84 0.75 - - - - 1.08 
15 Israel - - - 0.71 0.72 - - - - - 
16 Italy 1.35 (0.26) - 1.02 0.87 2.59 0.98 1.25 1.32 1.36 
17 Japan 1.81 0.05 4.55 1.06 0.99 - - - - - 
18 Korea - - - 0.91 0.98 1.11 (0.28) 3.44 0.93 0.93 
19 Malaysia 1.53 (0.58) 4.20 1.17 0.89 - - - - - 
20 Mexico 1.98 0.42 4.00 1.09 1.17 1.71 0.15 2.13 1.11 0.97 
21 Netherlands 2.56 0.00 6.50 1.07 1.18 2.02 (0.54) 3.00 1.09 0.89 
22 Norway 2.75 0.23 3.50 0.76 0.96 1.41 (1.11) 4.50 0.86 0.71 
23 NZ 1.12 (1.18) 1.00 1.50 0.86 - - - - - 
24 Peru 1.25 (0.32) 3.00 0.97 0.92 - - - - 1.59 
25 Phillipines 1.32 (0.26) 3.00 0.78 0.84 1.80 0.22 4.00 1.08 1.07 
26 Poland 1.83 (0.25) List Yr. 0.88 0.79 1.36 (0.72) List Yr. 0.94 1.07 
27 Portugal - - - 1.42 1.03 2.15 0.57 1.50 1.34 1.44 
28 Singapore 1.92 (0.12) 3.86 1.26 0.92 - - - 0.74 0.69 
29 Spain 1.28 (0.86) 9.00* 1.67 0.87 - - - 0.91 0.83 
30 Sth Africa 2.05 0.02 2.13 1.06 0.97 1.39 (0.64) 1.00 0.75 0.84 
31 Sweden 1.58 (0.82) 4.50 0.82 0.80 1.58 (0.82) 2.00 1.04 0.87 
32 Switzerland 1.84 0.16 3.67 0.93 1.11 2.70 1.02 2.00 1.79 1.49 
33 Taiwan - - - - - 2.76 0.26 2.79 1.30 1.05 
34 Thailand 1.50 0.07 4.75 1.30 1.24 1.27 (0.16) 3.00 1.90 1.09 
35 Turkey 1.96 (0.60) 1.00 0.82 0.84 3.15 0.59 3.00 1.03 0.85 
36 U.K 2.21 (0.31) 4.53 0.94 0.87 - - - - 0.82 
 Total 1.89 (0.12) 3.54 1.04 0.75 1.85 (0.16) 2.79 1.08 0.93 
List Yr. Denotes “List Year” 
* Denotes a single firm. 
In this table I report the mean value of cross-listed (Level 1 & Rule 144a) firms in 1997. The mean difference is reported in the column labeled D (q) 1997. 
In the remaining columns, I report by country, and for each subset of cross-listed firms, the average number of years listed in the U.S. in 1997 [Ave # 
Years List in 1997], and the relative value of cross-listed firms in the year the firm listed in the U.S. [Rel. q on List Year], and post-listing [Rel q post-
listing]. Relative value is calculated as the value of each cross-listed firms divided by the average value of non-cross-listed firms in each year. 
 
Appendix 3: Treatment Effects Models 
In this section, I outline cross-section and panel treatment effect models. I begin with the cross-
sectional approach. Lets begin with the following standard valuation equation: 
i i iq X CL= α + β+ δ + ε  (A.1) 
Where iX  is a set of exogenous observable characteristics of the firm, iCL  is a standard 
dummy variable that take the value of 1 if the firm trades in the United States and iε  is a standard 
idiosyncratic disturbance term 
And a cross-listing decision equation as: 
* * *
i i i i i i iCL Z u ,CL 1 if CL 0,CL 0 if CL 0= γ + = > = <  (A.2) 
Where *iCL  is an unobserved latent variable, iZ  is a set of observable firm-level characteristics 
that determine the decision to cross-list in the United States, and iu  is a disturbance term. Selection 
bias arises because of the correlation between iCL  and iε . This correlation can arise in two instances 
i.e. (1) selection on observables which arises through correlation between iZ  and iε , or (2) through 
selection on unobservables i.e. correlation between iε  and iu . Both instances render ordinary least 
squares estimates of the effect of cross listing on value, biased. 
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Given Eq. (A.2), and lets assume that the error terms from both equations are jointly normally 
distributed, with means zero, and standard deviations u,εσ σ  (normalized to one) and correlation ρ , the 
expected value of the cross-listed firm is given by: 
i i i i i
i i i i1 i
E[q CL 1] X E[ CL 1]
E[q CL 1] X ( Z )ε
= = β + δ + ε =
= = β + δ +ρσ λ γ  (A.3) 
Where i1 i( Z )λ γ  is the ‘inverse mills ratio’, and is computed as ( )i
i
( Z )
( Z )
φ γ Φ γ , where (.), (.)φ Φ  
are the density and cumulative density functions for the standard normal, respectively. Given Eq. 
(A.3), the value of a firm that chooses not to cross-list is: 
i i i i 2 iE[q CL 0] X ( Z )ε= = β +ρσ λ γ  (A.4) 
Where i 2 i( Z )λ γ  is computed as ( )i
i
( Z )
[1 ( Z )]
−φ γ −Φ γ . Thus, the difference in value for the cross 
and non-cross-listed firms is given by: 
i
i i i i
i i
( Z )E[q CL 1] E[q CL 0] [ ( Z )(1 ( Z ))]
ερσ φ γ⎡ ⎤= − = = δ + Φ γ −Φ γ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (A.5) 
Thus, ordinary least squares estimates of the effects of cross listing on firm value will be biased 
upwards, if 0ρ > , which is expected for cross listed firms. Two-step treatment effects models correct 
for this. The first-step (probit/logit) obtains estimates of γ  in Eq. (A.2), which are used to compute 
i1 i 2,λ λ . Next, Eq. (A.1) is estimated using ordinary least squares, but with an additional right hand side 
variable, iλ , computed as i1 i i i 2 i i( Z )CL ( Z )(1 CL )λ γ + λ γ − . The selection-corrected valuation equation 
is: 
i i i iq X CL λ= α + β+ δ + δ λ + ε  (A.6) 
The panel version of the treatment effects model is as follows. First, the valuation equation is 
given by: 
it it 1 it t itq X CL= α + β + δ +α + υ  (A.7) 
And the selection equation: 
* * *
it it it it it it itCL Z ,CL 1 if CL 0,CL 0 if CL 0= γ +η = > = <  (A.8) 
Under the assumption that the error terms are bivariate normal, the generalized residual from 
the first-stage probit is: 
it it 1 itE(q |C 1) ( Z )υ= = ρσ λ β  (A.9) 
Where 1 it( Z )λ β  is computed as it
it
( Z )
( Z )
ϕ β φ β , which is a series of time-specific ‘inverse mills 
ratios’. Substituting into Eq. (A.7) yields: 
it it 1 it 1 2 i itq X CL c= α + β + δ + λ β + + υ  (A.10) 
 
